![]() ![]() Moral and modal truth is not about moral or modal facts it is about our attitudes regarding actions, events, objects, and the like.ĢDeveloping a projectivist theory of the modal is all very well. The facts that make for the truth or falsity of various utterances in moral or modal discourses are facts about us they are our own attitudes/commitments that we project onto the world and this projection gives us an illusion of a certain kind of fact-based objectivity. We can have truth, but there is no “out there” about it. Blackburn eschews this portion of typical realist ideology for moral and modal claims. Realists typically want the truth of claims about subject matters regarding which they are realists to be a matter of something “objective”, something “out there”, something not wholly about us and our beliefs, or our conceptual capabilities or linguistic practices. ![]() It is “merely” quasi-realism, though, because he parts company with many realists regarding what it is for a claim regarding morals or modals to be true. Likewise when we say that some things are possible and others not. ![]() His position is realist because he accepts that we sometimes speak truly when we say that some things are right and others wrong. 1Simon Blackburn is a quasi-realist about both moral and modal discourse. ![]()
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